[erlang-questions] SSL: Getting master_secret and client_random (or premaster_secret)

[Ingela Andin]

Hi!

2017-01-13 11:43 GMT+01:00 Roger Lipscombe <roger@REDACTED>:

> On 13 January 2017 at 09:39, Ingela Andin <ingela.andin@REDACTED> wrote:
> > Well our reasoning at the moment is that we could add a debug
> possibility,
> > that would let connection_information
> > return client/server/master_secret values for connections started in
> debug
> > mode. Just like you can configure a connection to run anonymous ciphers
> > suites for test and debugging purposes. However we would
> > not want connection_information to return these values by default. Even
> if
> > you conceptually can get at the information by hacking we do not want to
> > make it easy to do bad things to security by "accident" or
> > otherwise.
>
> Sure. There's precedent for that: process_info/1 doesn't return
> everything that you can ask for in process_info/2, no?
>
> I'm not sure how this would do bad things to security. The server's
> already seeing the plaintext, otherwise it couldn't do its job. Could
> you explain your concerns further?
>


As long as it stays on the server....  TLS is suppose to provide peer to
peer security
and you are not suppose to be able to read TLS data in traffic sniffing
logs.
What if someone decides to transfer the logs in an insecure way from the
server!

What if someone thinks its a good idea to decrypt the data outside the TLS
connection in the server
and send it to an external logging server in the clear!

Openssl also warns for missuse:
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_master_key.html

When it comes to security you should be very careful is all I am saying,
and providing a way for others
to use secret information in a not intended way is potentially dangerous.

Regards Ingela Erlang/OTP Team - Ericsson AB
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