-spec cacerts_clear() -> boolean().

Clears any loaded CA certificates, returns true if any was loaded.

-spec cacerts_get() -> [combined_cert()].

Returns the trusted CA certificates if any are loaded, otherwise uses cacerts_load/0 to load them. The function fails if no cacerts could be loaded.

-spec cacerts_load() -> ok | {error, Reason :: term()}.

Loads the OS supplied trusted CA certificates.

-spec cacerts_load(File :: file:filename_all()) -> ok | {error, Reason :: term()}.

Loads the trusted CA certificates from a file.

-spec compute_key(OthersECDHkey, MyECDHkey) -> SharedSecret
               when
                   OthersECDHkey :: #'ECPoint'{point :: term()},
                   MyECDHkey ::
                       #'ECPrivateKey'{version :: term(),
                                       privateKey :: term(),
                                       parameters :: term(),
                                       publicKey :: term(),
                                       attributes :: term()},
                   SharedSecret :: binary().

Computes shared secret.

-spec compute_key(OthersDHkey, MyDHkey, DHparms) -> SharedSecret
               when
                   OthersDHkey :: crypto:dh_public(),
                   MyDHkey :: crypto:dh_private(),
                   DHparms ::
                       #'DHParameter'{prime :: term(),
                                      base :: term(),
                                      privateValueLength :: term()},
                   SharedSecret :: binary().

Computes shared secret.

-spec decrypt_private(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText
                   when CipherText :: binary(), Key :: rsa_private_key(), PlainText :: binary().

Equivalent to decrypt_private/3.

-spec decrypt_private(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText
                   when
                       CipherText :: binary(),
                       Key :: rsa_private_key(),
                       Options :: crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts(),
                       PlainText :: binary().

Public-key decryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_decrypt/4

-spec decrypt_public(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText
                  when CipherText :: binary(), Key :: rsa_public_key(), PlainText :: binary().

Equivalent to decrypt_public/3.

-spec decrypt_public(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText
                  when
                      CipherText :: binary(),
                      Key :: rsa_public_key(),
                      Options :: crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts(),
                      PlainText :: binary().

Public-key decryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_decrypt/4

-spec der_decode(Asn1Type, Der) -> Entity
              when Asn1Type :: asn1_type(), Der :: der_encoded(), Entity :: term().

Decodes a public-key ASN.1 DER encoded entity.

-spec der_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> Der
              when Asn1Type :: asn1_type(), Entity :: term(), Der :: binary().

Encodes a public-key entity with ASN.1 DER encoding.

-spec dh_gex_group(MinSize, SuggestedSize, MaxSize, Groups) -> {ok, {Size, Group}} | {error, term()}
                when
                    MinSize :: pos_integer(),
                    SuggestedSize :: pos_integer(),
                    MaxSize :: pos_integer(),
                    Groups :: undefined | [{Size, [Group]}],
                    Size :: pos_integer(),
                    Group :: {G, P},
                    G :: pos_integer(),
                    P :: pos_integer().

Selects a group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the key size in the range MinSize...MaxSize and as close to SuggestedSize as possible. If Groups == undefined a default set will be used, otherwise the group is selected from Groups.

First a size, as close as possible to SuggestedSize, is selected. Then one group with that key size is randomly selected from the specified set of groups. If no size within the limits of MinSize and MaxSize is available, {error,no_group_found} is returned.

The default set of groups is listed in lib/public_key/priv/moduli. This file may be regenerated like this:

	$> cd $ERL_TOP/lib/public_key/priv/
	$> generate
         ---- wait until all background jobs has finished. It may take several days !
	$> cat moduli-* > moduli
	$> cd ..; make

-spec encrypt_private(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText
                   when PlainText :: binary(), Key :: rsa_private_key(), CipherText :: binary().

Equivalent to encrypt_private/3.

-spec encrypt_private(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText
                   when
                       PlainText :: binary(),
                       Key :: rsa_private_key(),
                       Options :: crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts() | custom_key_opts(),
                       CipherText :: binary().

Public-key encryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_encrypt/4. The key, can besides a standard RSA key, be a map specifing the key algorithm rsa and a fun to handle the encryption operation. This may be used for customized the encryption operation with for instance hardware security modules (HSM) or trusted platform modules (TPM).

-spec encrypt_public(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText
                  when PlainText :: binary(), Key :: rsa_public_key(), CipherText :: binary().

Equivalent to encrypt_public/3.

-spec encrypt_public(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText
                  when
                      PlainText :: binary(),
                      Key :: rsa_public_key(),
                      Options :: crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts(),
                      CipherText :: binary().

Public-key encryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_encrypt/4.

-spec generate_key(DHparams | ECparams | RSAparams) -> DHkeys | ECkey | RSAkey
                when
                    DHparams ::
                        #'DHParameter'{prime :: term(),
                                       base :: term(),
                                       privateValueLength :: term()},
                    DHkeys :: {PublicDH :: binary(), PrivateDH :: binary()},
                    ECparams :: ecpk_parameters_api(),
                    ECkey ::
                        #'ECPrivateKey'{version :: term(),
                                        privateKey :: term(),
                                        parameters :: term(),
                                        publicKey :: term(),
                                        attributes :: term()},
                    RSAparams :: {rsa, Size, PubExp},
                    Size :: pos_integer(),
                    PubExp :: pos_integer(),
                    RSAkey ::
                        #'RSAPrivateKey'{version :: term(),
                                         modulus :: term(),
                                         publicExponent :: term(),
                                         privateExponent :: term(),
                                         prime1 :: term(),
                                         prime2 :: term(),
                                         exponent1 :: term(),
                                         exponent2 :: term(),
                                         coefficient :: term(),
                                         otherPrimeInfos :: term()}.

Generates a new key pair. Note that except for Diffie-Hellman the public key is included in the private key structure. See also crypto:generate_key/2

-spec pem_decode(binary()) -> [pem_entry()].

Decodes PEM binary data and returns entries as ASN.1 DER encoded entities.

Example {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cert.pem"). PemEntries = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).

-spec pem_encode([pem_entry()]) -> binary().

Creates a PEM binary.

-spec pem_entry_decode(PemEntry) -> term() when PemEntry :: pem_entry().

Equivalent to pem_entry_decode/2.

-spec pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password) -> term()
                    when PemEntry :: pem_entry(), Password :: iodata() | fun(() -> iodata()).

Decodes a PEM entry. pem_decode/1 returns a list of PEM entries. Notice that if the PEM entry is of type 'SubjectPublickeyInfo', it is further decoded to an rsa_public_key/0 or dsa_public_key/0.

Password can be either an octet string or function which returns same type.

-spec pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> pem_entry()
                    when Asn1Type :: pki_asn1_type(), Entity :: term().

Equivalent to pem_entry_encode/3.

-spec pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, InfoPwd) -> pem_entry()
                    when
                        Asn1Type :: pki_asn1_type(),
                        Entity :: term(),
                        InfoPwd :: {CipherInfo, Password},
                        CipherInfo :: cipher_info(),
                        Password :: iodata().

Creates a PEM entry that can be feed to pem_encode/1.

If Asn1Type is 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', Entity must be either an rsa_public_key/0, dsa_public_key/0 or an ec_public_key/0 and this function creates the appropriate 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' entry.

-spec pkix_crl_issuer(CRL) -> Issuer
                   when
                       CRL ::
                           der_encoded() |
                           #'CertificateList'{tbsCertList :: term(),
                                              signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                              signature :: term()},
                       Issuer :: issuer_name().

Returns the issuer of the CRL.

-spec pkix_crl_verify(CRL, Cert) -> boolean()
                   when
                       CRL ::
                           der_encoded() |
                           #'CertificateList'{tbsCertList :: term(),
                                              signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                              signature :: term()},
                       Cert :: cert().

Verify that Cert is the CRL signer.

-spec pkix_crls_validate(OTPcertificate, DPandCRLs, Options) -> CRLstatus
                      when
                          OTPcertificate ::
                              #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate :: term(),
                                                signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                                signature :: term()},
                          DPandCRLs :: [DPandCRL],
                          DPandCRL :: {DP, {DerCRL, CRL}},
                          DP ::
                              #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint :: term(),
                                                   reasons :: term(),
                                                   cRLIssuer :: term()},
                          DerCRL :: der_encoded(),
                          CRL ::
                              #'CertificateList'{tbsCertList :: term(),
                                                 signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                                 signature :: term()},
                          Options :: [{atom(), term()}],
                          CRLstatus :: valid | {bad_cert, BadCertReason},
                          BadCertReason ::
                              revocation_status_undetermined |
                              {revocation_status_undetermined, Reason :: term()} |
                              {revoked, crl_reason()}.

Performs CRL validation. It is intended to be called from the verify fun of pkix_path_validation/3 .

Available options:

• {update_crl, fun()} - The fun has the following type specification:

   fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}) ->
          #'CertificateList'{}

  The fun uses the information in the distribution point to access the latest possible version of the CRL. If this fun is not specified, Public Key uses the default implementation:

   fun(_DP, CRL) -> CRL end

• {issuer_fun, fun()} - The fun has the following type specification:

  fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{},
      {rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}, term()) ->
    {ok, #'OTPCertificate'{}, [der_encoded]}

  The fun returns the root certificate and certificate chain that has signed the CRL.

   fun(DP, CRL, Issuer, UserState) -> {ok, RootCert, CertChain}

• {undetermined_details, boolean()} - Defaults to false. When revocation status cannot be determined, and this option is set to true, details of why no CRLs where accepted are included in the return value.

-spec pkix_decode_cert(Cert, Type) ->
                    #'Certificate'{tbsCertificate :: term(),
                                   signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                   signature :: term()} |
                    otp_cert()
                    when Cert :: der_cert(), Type :: plain | otp.

Decodes an ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Option otp uses the customized ASN.1 specification OTP-PKIX.asn1 for decoding and also recursively decode most of the standard parts.

-spec pkix_dist_point(Cert) -> DistPoint
                   when
                       Cert :: cert(),
                       DistPoint ::
                           #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint :: term(),
                                                reasons :: term(),
                                                cRLIssuer :: term()}.

Creates a distribution point for CRLs issued by the same issuer as Cert. Can be used as input to pkix_crls_validate/3

-spec pkix_dist_points(Cert) -> DistPoints
                    when
                        Cert :: cert(),
                        DistPoints ::
                            [#'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint :: term(),
                                                  reasons :: term(),
                                                  cRLIssuer :: term()}].

Extracts distribution points from the certificates extensions.

-spec pkix_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, Type) -> Der
               when
                   Asn1Type :: asn1_type(),
                   Entity :: term(),
                   Type :: otp | plain,
                   Der :: der_encoded().

DER encodes a PKIX x509 certificate or part of such a certificate. This function must be used for encoding certificates or parts of certificates that are decoded/created in the otp format, whereas for the plain format this function directly calls der_encode/2.

Note

Subtle ASN-1 encoding errors in certificates may be worked around when decoding, this may have the affect that the encoding a certificate back to DER may generate different bytes then the supplied original.

-spec pkix_hash_type(HashOid :: oid()) -> DigestType :: md5 | crypto:sha1() | crypto:sha2().

Translates OID to Erlang digest type

-spec pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(Cert) -> boolean() when Cert :: cert().

Checks if a certificate is a fixed Diffie-Hellman certificate.

-spec pkix_is_issuer(CertorCRL, IssuerCert) -> boolean()
                  when
                      CertorCRL ::
                          cert() |
                          #'CertificateList'{tbsCertList :: term(),
                                             signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                             signature :: term()},
                      IssuerCert :: cert().

Checks if IssuerCert issued Cert.

-spec pkix_is_self_signed(Cert) -> boolean() when Cert :: cert().

Checks if a certificate is self-signed.

-spec pkix_issuer_id(Cert, IssuedBy) -> {ok, ID :: cert_id()} | {error, Reason}
                  when Cert :: cert(), IssuedBy :: self | other, Reason :: term().

Returns the x509 certificate issuer id, if it can be determined.

-spec pkix_match_dist_point(CRL, DistPoint) -> boolean()
                         when
                             CRL ::
                                 der_encoded() |
                                 #'CertificateList'{tbsCertList :: term(),
                                                    signatureAlgorithm :: term(),
                                                    signature :: term()},
                             DistPoint ::
                                 #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint :: term(),
                                                      reasons :: term(),
                                                      cRLIssuer :: term()}.

Checks whether the given distribution point matches the Issuing Distribution Point of the CRL, as described in RFC 5280. If the CRL doesn't have an Issuing Distribution Point extension, the distribution point always matches.

-spec pkix_normalize_name(Issuer) -> Normalized
                       when Issuer :: issuer_name() | der_encoded(), Normalized :: issuer_name().

Normalizes an issuer name so that it can be easily compared to another issuer name.

-spec pkix_ocsp_validate(Cert, IssuerCert, OcspRespDer, NonceExt, Options) ->
                      ok | {error, {bad_cert, Reason}}
                      when
                          Cert :: cert(),
                          IssuerCert :: cert(),
                          OcspRespDer :: der_encoded(),
                          NonceExt :: undefined | binary(),
                          Options ::
                              [{is_trusted_responder_fun, fun((combined_cert()) -> boolean)}],
                          Reason :: bad_cert_reason().

Perform OCSP response validation according to RFC 6960. Returns 'ok' when OCSP response is successfully validated and {error, {bad_cert, Reason}} otherwise.

Available options:

• {is_trusted_responder_fun, fun()} - The fun has the following type specification:

   fun(#cert{}) ->
      boolean()

  The fun returns the true if certificate in the argument is trusted. If this fun is not specified, Public Key uses the default implementation:

   fun(_) -> false end

-spec pkix_path_validation(Cert, CertChain, Options) ->
                        {ok, {PublicKeyInfo, ConstrainedPolicyNodes}} |
                        {error, {bad_cert, Reason :: bad_cert_reason()}}
                        when
                            Cert :: cert() | atom(),
                            CertChain :: [cert() | combined_cert()],
                            Options ::
                                [{max_path_length, integer()} | {verify_fun, {fun(), term()}}],
                            PublicKeyInfo :: public_key_info(),
                            ConstrainedPolicyNodes :: [policy_node()].

Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280. However, CRL validation is done separately by pkix_crls_validate/3 and is to be called from the supplied verify_fun. The policy tree check was added in OTP-26.2 and if the certificates include policies the constrained policy set with potential qualifiers will be returned, these values are derived from the policy tree created as part of the path validation algorithm. The constrained set can be constrained only by the Certificate Authorities or also by the user when the option policy_set is provided to this function. The qualifiers convey information about the valid policy and is intended as information to end users.

Available options:

• {verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()} - The fun must be defined as:

  fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
      Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
               {extension, #'Extension'{}},
      InitialUserState :: term()) ->
    {valid, UserState :: term()} |
    {valid_peer, UserState :: term()} |
    {fail, Reason :: term()} |
    {unknown, UserState :: term()}.

  If the verify callback fun returns {fail, Reason}, the verification process is immediately stopped. If the verify callback fun returns {valid, UserState}, the verification process is continued. This can be used to accept specific path validation errors, such as selfsigned_peer, as well as verifying application-specific extensions. If called with an extension unknown to the user application, the return value {unknown, UserState} is to be used.

  Warning

  Note that user defined custom verify_fun may alter original path validation error (e.g selfsigned_peer). Use with caution.

• {max_path_length, integer()} - The max_path_length is the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that can follow the peer certificate in a valid certification path. So, if max_path_length is 0, the PEER must be signed by the trusted ROOT-CA directly, if it is 1, the path can be PEER, CA, ROOT-CA, if it is 2, the path can be PEER, CA, CA, ROOT-CA, and so on.

• {policy_set, [oid()]}(Since OTP 26.2)
  The set of policies that will be accepted, defaults to the special value [?anyPolicy] that will accept all policies.

• {explicit_policy, boolean()}(Since OTP 26.2)
  Explicitly require that each certificate in the path must include at least one of the certificate policies in the policy_set.

• {inhibit_policy_mapping, boolean()}(Since OTP 26.2)
  Prevent policies to be mapped to other policies.

• {inhibit_any_policy, boolean()}(Since OTP 26.2)
  Prevent the special policy ?anyPolicy from being accepted.

Explanations of reasons for a bad certificate:

• cert_expired - Certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.

• invalid_issuer - Certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in the chain.

• invalid_signature - Certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.

• name_not_permitted - Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.

• missing_basic_constraint - Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have a basic constraints extension.

• invalid_key_usage - Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key-usage extension.

• {revoked, crl_reason()} - Certificate has been revoked.

• invalid_validity_dates - The validity section of the X.509 certificate(s) contains invalid date formats not matching the RFC.

• atom() - Application-specific error reason that is to be checked by the verify_fun.

-spec pkix_sign(Cert, Key) -> Der
             when
                 Cert ::
                     #'OTPTBSCertificate'{version :: term(),
                                          serialNumber :: term(),
                                          signature :: term(),
                                          issuer :: term(),
                                          validity :: term(),
                                          subject :: term(),
                                          subjectPublicKeyInfo :: term(),
                                          issuerUniqueID :: term(),
                                          subjectUniqueID :: term(),
                                          extensions :: term()},
                 Key :: private_key(),
                 Der :: der_encoded().

Signs an 'OTPTBSCertificate'. Returns the corresponding DER-encoded certificate.

-spec pkix_sign_types(AlgorithmId) -> {DigestType, SignatureType}
                   when
                       AlgorithmId :: oid(),
                       DigestType :: crypto:rsa_digest_type() | none,
                       SignatureType :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa | eddsa.

Translates signature algorithm OID to Erlang digest and signature types.

The AlgorithmId is the signature OID from a certificate or a certificate revocation list.

-spec pkix_subject_id(Cert) -> ID when Cert :: cert(), ID :: cert_id().

Returns the X509 certificate subject id.

-spec pkix_test_data(ChainConf) -> TestConf
                  when
                      ChainConf ::
                          #{server_chain := chain_opts(), client_chain := chain_opts()} |
                          chain_opts(),
                      TestConf :: test_config() | [conf_opt()].

Creates certificate configuration(s) consisting of certificate and its private key plus CA certificate bundle, for a client and a server, intended to facilitate automated testing of applications using X509-certificates, often through SSL/TLS. The test data can be used when you have control over both the client and the server in a test scenario.

When this function is called with a map containing client and server chain specifications; it generates both a client and a server certificate chain where the cacerts returned for the server contains the root cert the server should trust and the intermediate certificates the server should present to connecting clients. The root cert the server should trust is the one used as root of the client certificate chain. Vice versa applies to the cacerts returned for the client. The root cert(s) can either be pre-generated with pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or if options are specified; it is (they are) generated.

When this function is called with a list of certificate options; it generates a configuration with just one node certificate where cacerts contains the root cert and the intermediate certs that should be presented to a peer. In this case the same root cert must be used for all peers. This is useful in for example an Erlang distributed cluster where any node, towards another node, acts either as a server or as a client depending on who connects to whom. The generated certificate contains a subject altname, which is not needed in a client certificate, but makes the certificate useful for both roles.

Explanation of the options used to customize certificates in the generated chains:

• {digest, digest_type()} - Hash algorithm to be used for signing the certificate together with the key option. Defaults to sha that is sha1.

• {key, key_params() | private_key()} - Parameters to be used to call public_key:generate_key/1, to generate a key, or an existing key. Defaults to generating an ECDSA key. Note this could fail if Erlang/OTP is compiled with a very old cryptolib.

• {validity, {From::erlang:timestamp(), To::erlang:timestamp()}} - The validity period of the certificate.

• {extensions, [#'Extension'{}]} - Extensions to include in the certificate.

  Default extensions included in CA certificates if not otherwise specified are:

  [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
                extnValue = [keyCertSign, cRLSign],
                critical = false},
  #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints',
               extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = true},
               critical = true}]

  Default extensions included in the server peer cert if not otherwise specified are:

  [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
                extnValue = [digitalSignature, keyAgreement],
                critical = false},
  #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName',
               extnValue = [{dNSName, Hostname}],
               critical = false}]

  Hostname is the result of calling net_adm:localhost() in the Erlang node where this function is called.

Note

Note that the generated certificates and keys does not provide a formally correct PKIX-trust-chain and they cannot be used to achieve real security. This function is provided for testing purposes only.

-spec pkix_test_root_cert(Name, Options) -> RootCert
                       when
                           Name :: string(), Options :: [cert_opt()], RootCert :: test_root_cert().

Generates a root certificate that can be used in multiple calls to pkix_test_data/1 when you want the same root certificate for several generated certificates.

-spec pkix_verify(Cert, Key) -> boolean() when Cert :: der_cert(), Key :: public_key().

Verifies PKIX x.509 certificate signature.

-spec pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs) -> boolean()
                        when Cert :: cert(), ReferenceIDs :: referenceIDs().

Equivalent to pkix_verify_hostname/3.

-spec pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs, Options) -> boolean()
                        when
                            Cert :: cert(),
                            ReferenceIDs :: referenceIDs(),
                            Options :: [{match_fun | fail_callback | fqdn_fun, fun()}].

This function checks that the Presented Identifier (e.g hostname) in a peer certificate is in agreement with at least one of the Reference Identifier that the client expects to be connected to. The function is intended to be added as an extra client check of the peer certificate when performing public_key:pkix_path_validation/3

See RFC 6125 for detailed information about hostname verification. The User's Guide and code examples describes this function more detailed.

The option funs are described here:

• match_fun

  fun(ReferenceId::ReferenceId() | FQDN::string(),
      PresentedId::{dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string() |
                   {iPAddress,list(byte())} | {OtherId::atom()|oid(),term()}})

  This function replaces the default host name matching rules. The fun should return a boolean to tell if the Reference ID and Presented ID matches or not. The match fun can also return a third value, value, the atom default, if the default matching rules shall apply. This makes it possible to augment the tests with a special case:

  fun(....) -> true;   % My special case
     (_, _) -> default % all others falls back to the inherit tests
  end

  See pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun/1 for a function that takes a protocol name as argument and returns a fun/2 suitable for this option and Re-defining the match operation in the User's Guide for an example.

  Note

  Reference Id values given as binaries will be converted to strings, and ip references may be given in string format that is "10.0.1.1" or "1234::5678:9012" as well as on the format inet:ip_address/0

• fail_callback - If a matching fails, there could be circumstances when the certificate should be accepted anyway. Think for example of a web browser where you choose to accept an outdated certificate. This option enables implementation of such an exception but for hostnames. This fun/1 is called when no ReferenceID matches. The return value of the fun (a boolean/0) decides the outcome. If true the the certificate is accepted otherwise it is rejected. See "Pinning" a Certificate in the User's Guide.

• fqdn_fun - This option augments the host name extraction from URIs and other Reference IDs. It could for example be a very special URI that is not standardised. The fun takes a Reference ID as argument and returns one of:

  • the hostname
  • the atom default: the default host name extract function will be used
  • the atom undefined: a host name could not be extracted. The pkix_verify_hostname/3 will return false.

  For an example, see Hostname extraction in the User's Guide.

-spec pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(Protocol) -> Result when Protocol :: https, Result :: fun().

The return value of calling this function is intended to be used in the match_fun option in pkix_verify_hostname/3.

The returned fun augments the verify hostname matching according to the specific rules for the protocol in the argument.

Note

Currently supported https fun will allow wildcard certificate matching as specified by the HTTP standard. Note that for instance LDAP have a different set of wildcard matching rules. If you do not want to allow wildcard certificates (recommended from a security perspective) or otherwise customize the hostname match the default match function used by ssl application will be sufficient.

-spec short_name_hash(Name) -> string() when Name :: issuer_name().

Generates a short hash of an issuer name. The hash is returned as a string containing eight hexadecimal digits.

The return value of this function is the same as the result of the commands openssl crl -hash and openssl x509 -issuer_hash, when passed the issuer name of a CRL or a certificate, respectively. This hash is used by the c_rehash tool to maintain a directory of symlinks to CRL files, in order to facilitate looking up a CRL by its issuer name.

-spec sign(Msg, DigestType, Key) -> Signature
        when
            Msg :: binary() | {digest, binary()},
            DigestType :: digest_type(),
            Key :: private_key(),
            Signature :: binary().

Equivalent to sign/4.

-spec sign(Msg, DigestType, Key, Options) -> Signature
        when
            Msg :: binary() | {digest, binary()},
            DigestType :: digest_type(),
            Key :: private_key(),
            Options :: crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts() | custom_key_opts(),
            Signature :: binary().

Creates a digital signature.

The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data to be signed or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest. The key, can besides a standard key, be a map specifing a key algorithm and a fun that should handle the signing. This may be used for customized signing with for instance hardware security modules (HSM) or trusted platform modules (TPM).

-spec verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key) -> boolean()
          when
              Msg :: binary() | {digest, binary()},
              DigestType :: digest_type(),
              Signature :: binary(),
              Key :: public_key().

Equivalent to verify/5.

-spec verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key, Options) -> boolean()
          when
              Msg :: binary() | {digest, binary()},
              DigestType :: digest_type(),
              Signature :: binary(),
              Key :: public_key(),
              Options :: crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts().

Verifies a digital signature.

The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest.