View Source Getting Started
This section describes examples of how to use the Public Key API. Keys and certificates used in the following sections are generated only for testing the Public Key application.
Some shell printouts in the following examples are abbreviated for increased readability.
PEM Files
Public-key data (keys, certificates, and so on) can be stored in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format. The PEM files have the following structure:
<text>
-----BEGIN <SOMETHING>-----
<Attribute> : <Value>
<Base64 encoded DER data>
-----END <SOMETHING>-----
<text>
A file can contain several BEGIN/END
blocks. Text lines between blocks are
ignored. Attributes, if present, are ignored except for Proc-Type
and
DEK-Info
, which are used when DER
data is encrypted.
DSA Private Key
A DSA private key can look as follows:
Note
File handling is not done by the Public Key application.
1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("dsa.pem").
{ok,<<"-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIBuw"...>>}
The following PEM file has only one entry, a private DSA key:
2> [DSAEntry] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).
[{'DSAPrivateKey',<<48,130,1,187,2,1,0,2,129,129,0,183,
179,230,217,37,99,144,157,21,228,204,
162,207,61,246,...>>,
not_encrypted}]
3> Key = public_key:pem_entry_decode(DSAEntry).
#'DSAPrivateKey'{version = 0,
p = 12900045185019966618...6593,
q = 1216700114794736143432235288305776850295620488937,
g = 10442040227452349332...47213,
y = 87256807980030509074...403143,
x = 510968529856012146351317363807366575075645839654}
RSA Private Key with Password
An RSA private key encrypted with a password can look as follows:
1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("rsa.pem").
{ok,<<"Bag Attribute"...>>}
The following PEM file has only one entry, a private RSA key:
2>[RSAEntry] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).
[{'RSAPrivateKey',<<224,108,117,203,152,40,15,77,128,126,
221,195,154,249,85,208,202,251,109,
119,120,57,29,89,19,9,...>>,
{"DES-EDE3-CBC",<<"kÙeø¼pµL">>}}]
In this following example, the password is "abcd1234"
:
3> Key = public_key:pem_entry_decode(RSAEntry, "abcd1234").
#'RSAPrivateKey'{version = 'two-prime',
modulus = 1112355156729921663373...2737107,
publicExponent = 65537,
privateExponent = 58064406231183...2239766033,
prime1 = 11034766614656598484098...7326883017,
prime2 = 10080459293561036618240...77738643771,
exponent1 = 77928819327425934607...22152984217,
exponent2 = 36287623121853605733...20588523793,
coefficient = 924840412626098444...41820968343,
otherPrimeInfos = asn1_NOVALUE}
X509 Certificates
The following is an example of X509 certificates:
1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cacerts.pem").
{ok,<<"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC7jCCAl"...>>}
The following file includes two certificates:
2> [CertEntry1, CertEntry2] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).
[{'Certificate',<<48,130,2,238,48,130,2,87,160,3,2,1,2,2,
9,0,230,145,97,214,191,2,120,150,48,13,
...>>,
not_encrypted},
{'Certificate',<<48,130,3,200,48,130,3,49,160,3,2,1,2,2,1,
1,48,13,6,9,42,134,72,134,247,...>>,
not_encrypted}]
Certificates can be decoded as usual:
2> Cert = public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry1).
#'Certificate'{
tbsCertificate =
#'TBSCertificate'{
version = v3,serialNumber = 16614168075301976214,
signature =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
issuer =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = <<19,10,69,114,108,97,110,103,32,79,84,80>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = <<19,11,69,114,105,99,115,115,111,110,32,65,66>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = <<19,9,83,116,111,99,107,104,111,108,109>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,6},
value = <<19,2,83,69>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = <<22,22,112,101,116,101,114,64,101,114,...>>}]]},
validity =
#'Validity'{
notBefore = {utcTime,"080109082929Z"},
notAfter = {utcTime,"080208082929Z"}},
subject =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = <<19,10,69,114,108,97,110,103,32,79,84,80>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = <<19,11,69,114,105,99,115,115,111,110,32,...>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = <<19,9,83,116,111,99,107,104,111,108,...>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,6},
value = <<19,2,83,69>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = <<22,22,112,101,116,101,114,64,...>>}]]},
subjectPublicKeyInfo =
#'SubjectPublicKeyInfo'{
algorithm =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,1},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
subjectPublicKey =
{0,<<48,129,137,2,129,129,0,203,209,187,77,73,231,90,...>>}},
issuerUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
subjectUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
extensions =
[#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,19},
critical = true,
extnValue = [48,3,1,1,255]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,15},
critical = false,
extnValue = [3,2,1,6]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,14},
critical = false,
extnValue = [4,20,27,217,65,152,6,30,142|...]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,17},
critical = false,
extnValue = [48,24,129,22,112,101,116,101|...]}]},
signatureAlgorithm =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
signature =
<<163,186,7,163,216,152,63,47,154,234,139,73,154,96,120,
165,2,52,196,195,109,167,192,...>>}
Parts of certificates can be decoded with public_key:der_decode/2
, using the
ASN.1 type of that part. However, an application-specific certificate extension
requires application-specific ASN.1 decode/encode-functions. In the recent
example, the first value of rdnSequence
is of ASN.1 type
'X520CommonName'. ({2,5,4,3} = ?id-at-commonName)
:
public_key:der_decode('X520CommonName', <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>).
{printableString,"erlangCA"}
However, certificates can also be decoded using pkix_decode_cert/2
, which can
customize and recursively decode standard parts of a certificate:
3>{_, DerCert, _} = CertEntry1.
4> public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, otp).
#'OTPCertificate'{
tbsCertificate =
#'OTPTBSCertificate'{
version = v3,serialNumber = 16614168075301976214,
signature =
#'SignatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = 'NULL'},
issuer =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = {printableString,"erlangCA"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = {printableString,"Erlang OTP"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = {printableString,"Ericsson AB"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = {printableString,"Stockholm"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{type = {2,5,4,6},value = "SE"}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = "peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]]},
validity =
#'Validity'{
notBefore = {utcTime,"080109082929Z"},
notAfter = {utcTime,"080208082929Z"}},
subject =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = {printableString,"erlangCA"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = {printableString,"Erlang OTP"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = {printableString,"Ericsson AB"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = {printableString,"Stockholm"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{type = {2,5,4,6},value = "SE"}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = "peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]]},
subjectPublicKeyInfo =
#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{
algorithm =
#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,1},
parameters = 'NULL'},
subjectPublicKey =
#'RSAPublicKey'{
modulus =
1431267547247997...37419,
publicExponent = 65537}},
issuerUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
subjectUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
extensions =
[#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,19},
critical = true,
extnValue =
#'BasicConstraints'{
cA = true,pathLenConstraint = asn1_NOVALUE}},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,15},
critical = false,
extnValue = [keyCertSign,cRLSign]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,14},
critical = false,
extnValue = [27,217,65,152,6,30,142,132,245|...]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,17},
critical = false,
extnValue = [{rfc822Name,"peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]}]},
signatureAlgorithm =
#'SignatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = 'NULL'},
signature =
<<163,186,7,163,216,152,63,47,154,234,139,73,154,96,120,
165,2,52,196,195,109,167,192,...>>}
This call is equivalent to public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry1)
:
5> public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, plain).
#'Certificate'{ ...}
Encoding Public-Key Data to PEM Format
If you have public-key data and want to create a PEM file this can be done by
calling functions public_key:pem_entry_encode/2
and pem_encode/1
and saving
the result to a file. For example, assume that you have
PubKey = 'RSAPublicKey'{}
. Then you can create a PEM-"RSA PUBLIC KEY" file
(ASN.1 type 'RSAPublicKey'
) or a PEM-"PUBLIC KEY" file
('SubjectPublicKeyInfo'
ASN.1 type).
The second element of the PEM-entry is the ASN.1 DER
encoded key data:
1> PemEntry = public_key:pem_entry_encode('RSAPublicKey', RSAPubKey).
{'RSAPublicKey', <<48,72,...>>, not_encrypted}
2> PemBin = public_key:pem_encode([PemEntry]).
<<"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEgC...>>
3> file:write_file("rsa_pub_key.pem", PemBin).
ok
or:
1> PemEntry = public_key:pem_entry_encode('SubjectPublicKeyInfo', RSAPubKey).
{'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', <<48,92...>>, not_encrypted}
2> PemBin = public_key:pem_encode([PemEntry]).
<<"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFw...>>
3> file:write_file("pub_key.pem", PemBin).
ok
RSA Public-Key Cryptography
Suppose you have the following private key and a corresponding public key:
PrivateKey = #'RSAPrivateKey{}'
and the plaintextMsg = binary()
PublicKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{}
Then you can proceed as follows:
Encrypt with the private key:
RsaEncrypted = public_key:encrypt_private(Msg, PrivateKey),
Msg = public_key:decrypt_public(RsaEncrypted, PublicKey),
Encrypt with the public key:
RsaEncrypted = public_key:encrypt_public(Msg, PublicKey),
Msg = public_key:decrypt_private(RsaEncrypted, PrivateKey),
Note
You normally do only one of the encrypt or decrypt operations, and the peer does the other. This normally used in legacy applications as a primitive digital signature.
Digital Signatures
Suppose you have the following private key and a corresponding public key:
PrivateKey = #'RSAPrivateKey{}'
or#'DSAPrivateKey'{}
and the plaintextMsg = binary()
PublicKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{}
or{integer(), #'DssParams'{}}
Then you can proceed as follows:
Signature = public_key:sign(Msg, sha, PrivateKey),
true = public_key:verify(Msg, sha, Signature, PublicKey),
Note
You normally do only one of the sign or verify operations, and the peer does the other.
It can be appropriate to calculate the message digest before calling sign
or
verify
, and then use none
as second argument:
Digest = crypto:sha(Msg),
Signature = public_key:sign(Digest, none, PrivateKey),
true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),
Verifying a certificate hostname
Background
When a client checks a server certificate there are a number of checks available like checks that the certificate is not revoked, not forged or not out-of-date.
There are however attacks that are not detected by those checks. Suppose a bad guy has succeeded with a DNS infection. Then the client could believe it is connecting to one host but ends up at another but evil one. Though it is evil, it could have a perfectly legal certificate! The certificate has a valid signature, it is not revoked, the certificate chain is not faked and has a trusted root and so on.
To detect that the server is not the intended one, the client must additionally perform a hostname verification. This procedure is described in RFC 6125. The idea is that the certificate lists the hostnames it could be fetched from. This is checked by the certificate issuer when the certificate is signed. So if the certificate is issued by a trusted root the client could trust the host names signed in it.
There is a default hostname matching procedure defined in RFC 6125, section 6 as well as protocol dependent variations defined in RFC 6125 appendix B. The default procedure is implemented in public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2,3. It is possible for a client to hook in modified rules using the options list.
Some terminology is needed: the certificate presents hostname(s) on which it is valid. Those are called Presented IDs. The hostname(s) the client believes it connects to are called Reference IDs. The matching rules aims to verify that there is at least one of the Reference IDs that matches one of the Presented IDs. If not, the verification fails.
The IDs contains normal fully qualified domain names like e.g foo.example.com
,
but IP addresses are not recommended. The rfc describes why this is not
recommended as well as security considerations about how to acquire the
Reference IDs.
Internationalized domain names are not supported.
The verification process
Traditionally the Presented IDs were found in the Subject
certificate field as
CN
names. This is still quite common. When printing a certificate they show up
as:
$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem
...
Subject: C=SE, CN=example.com, CN=*.example.com, O=erlang.org
...
The example Subject
field has one C, two CN and one O part. It is only the CN
(Common Name) that is used by hostname verification. The two other (C and O) is
not used here even when they contain a domain name like the O part. The C and O
parts are defined elsewhere and meaningful only for other functions.
In the example the Presented IDs are example.com
as well as hostnames matching
*.example.com
. For example foo.example.com
and bar.example.com
both
matches but not foo.bar.example.com
. The name erlang.org
matches neither
since it is not a CN.
In case where the Presented IDs are fetched from the Subject
certificate
field, the names may contain wildcard characters. The function handles this as
defined in
chapter 6.4.3 in RFC 6125.
There may only be one wildcard character and that is in the first label, for
example: *.example.com
. This matches foo.example.com
but neither
example.com
nor foo.bar.example.com
.
There may be label characters before or/and after the wildcard. For example:
a*d.example.com
matches abcd.example.com
and ad.example.com
, but not
ab.cd.example.com
.
In the previous example there is no indication of which protocols are expected.
So a client has no indication of whether it is a web server, an ldap server or
maybe a sip server it is connected to. There are fields in the certificate that
can indicate this. To be more exact, the rfc introduces the usage of the
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name
in the X509v3 extensions
field:
$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem
...
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:kb.example.org, URI:https://www.example.org
...
Here kb.example.org
serves any protocol while www.example.org
presents a
secure web server.
The next example has both Subject
and Subject Alternate Name
present:
$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem
...
Subject: C=SE, CN=example.com, CN=*.example.com, O=erlang.org
...
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:kb.example.org, URI:https://www.example.org
...
The RFC states that if a certificate defines Reference IDs in a
Subject Alternate Name
field, the Subject
field MUST NOT be used for host
name checking, even if it contains valid CN names. Therefore only
kb.example.org
and https://www.example.org
matches. The match fails both for
example.com
and foo.example.com
because they are in the Subject
field
which is not checked because the Subject Alternate Name
field is present.
Function call examples
Note
Other applications like ssl/tls or https might have options that are passed down to the
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname
. You will probably not have to call it directly
Suppose our client expects to connect to the web server https://www.example.net. This URI is therefore the Reference IDs of the client. The call will be:
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost,
[{uri_id, "https://www.example.net"}
]).
The call will return true
or false
depending on the check. The caller do not
need to handle the matching rules in the rfc. The matching will proceed as:
- If there is a
Subject Alternate Name
field, the{uri_id,string()}
in the function call will be compared to any{uniformResourceIdentifier,string()}
in the Certificate field. If the twostrings()
are equal (case insensitive), there is a match. The same applies for any{dns_id,string()}
in the call which is compared with all{dNSName,string()}
in the Certificate field. - If there is NO
Subject Alternate Name
field, theSubject
field will be checked. AllCN
names will be compared to all hostnames extracted from{uri_id,string()}
and from{dns_id,string()}
.
Extending the search mechanism
The caller can use own extraction and matching rules. This is done with the two
options fqdn_fun
and match_fun
.
Hostname extraction
The fqdn_fun
extracts hostnames (Fully Qualified Domain Names) from uri_id or
other ReferenceIDs that are not pre-defined in the public_key function. Suppose
you have some URI with a very special protocol-part: myspecial://example.com"
.
Since this a non-standard URI there will be no hostname extracted for matching
CN-names in the Subject
.
To "teach" the function how to extract, you can give a fun which replaces the
default extraction function. The fqdn_fun
takes one argument and returns
either a string/0
to be matched to each CN-name or the atom default
which
will invoke the default fqdn extraction function. The return value undefined
removes the current URI from the fqdn extraction.
...
Extract = fun({uri_id, "myspecial://"++HostName}) -> HostName;
(_Else) -> default
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{fqdn_fun, Extract}])
...
Re-defining the match operation
The default matching handles dns_id and uri_id. In an uri_id the value is tested
for equality with a value from the Subject Alternate Name
. If some other kind
of matching is needed, use the match_fun
option.
The match_fun
takes two arguments and returns either true
, false
or
default
. The value default
will invoke the default match function.
...
Match = fun({uri_id,"myspecial://"++A},
{uniformResourceIdentifier,"myspecial://"++B}) ->
my_match(A,B);
(_RefID, _PresentedID) ->
default
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{match_fun, Match}]),
...
In case of a match operation between a ReferenceID and a CN value from the
Subject
field, the first argument to the fun is the extracted hostname from
the ReferenceID, and the second argument is the tuple {cn, string()}
taken
from the Subject
field. That makes it possible to have separate matching rules
for Presented IDs from the Subject
field and from the Subject Alternate Name
field.
The default matching transformes the ascii values in strings to lowercase before
comparing. The match_fun
is however called without any transformation applied
to the strings. The reason is to enable the user to do unforeseen handling of
the strings where the original format is needed.
"Pinning" a Certificate
The RFC 6125 defines pinning as:
"The act of establishing a cached name association between the application service's certificate and one of the client's reference identifiers, despite the fact that none of the presented identifiers matches the given reference identifier. ..."
The purpose is to have a mechanism for a human to accept an otherwise faulty Certificate. In for example a web browser, you could get a question like
Warning: you wanted to visit the site www.example.com, but the certificate is for shop.example.com. Accept anyway (yes/no)?"
This could be accomplished with the option fail_callback
which will be called
if the hostname verification fails:
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). % Record def
...
Fail = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{}=C) ->
case in_my_cache(C) orelse my_accept(C) of
true ->
enter_my_cache(C),
true;
false ->
false
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{fail_callback, Fail}]),
...