[erlang-questions] wow: MD5 broken

Michael Regen michael.regen@REDACTED
Mon Dec 3 13:30:01 CET 2007

On Dec 3, 2007 11:07 AM, Per Hedeland <per@REDACTED> wrote:

> Yes, this is basically what the originally referenced paper discusses.
> The point is, as I described in the part of my message that you snipped,
> that this is not how you use md5 (or any other hash) for integrity
> checking. Both you and earlier Michael Regen (about the "funny"
> application invented by the guys that wrote the paper) use the word
> "example" - and I have to wonder, example of what? Can either of you
> point to any real-world application where the possibiliy to modify two
> inputs such that they produce the same hash actually is a problem *per
> se*?

I tried to point out that there are several applications for the use of
hashes. For md5 (and others) some are broken (whenever the initial message
was created by a source you cannot trust) and some are still fine (initial
message was created by a trustworthy source).
In the case of md5 in Erlang's distribution mechanism I assume this falls
into the second category: Fine and not broken.

Regarding your question - if I understood it correctly: Take a look at NIST
and their FIPS 140-2 (Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules)
process. Now assume I want to get certification for my OpenSSL version.
Simplified: I prepare an innocent version of OpenSSL and the security policy
including hashes for my source code files (=initial message). Then NIST
reviews and certifies it (
Security is based on the assumption that I cannot create another (evil)
version of OpenSSL source code with the same hash codes as provided in the
security policy. Later you download my in the meanwhile changed OpenSSL
version, check the hashes and assume everything is fine.

I am puzzled that they are using HMAC-SHA1 in 2006 and even in 2007. Did I
miss anything? However, you get the point.

> By the way, this discussion really doesn't have much to do with Erlang,
> I'm not sure why Joe posted here in the first place - except for one
> thing that hasn't even been mentioned yet: The Erlang distribution
> mechanism uses md5 in the authentication process. Of course it isn't
> "broken" (yet) either, but changing to a "better" hash function is
> obviously a good idea.

I totally agree.

> Then again, everyone seems to think that the
> Erlang distribution is inherently unsafe anyway (for reasons that aren't
> obvious to me at least)...
> --Per Hedeland

I can just talk about myself. And I simply do not know whether it is safe or
not. I have not seen any reviews of it, neither bad nor good ones and I
assume that its ability to withstand attacks is not tested much because I
assume that most Erlang nodes are operated in a safe environment. Remember,
even OpenSSH had it's troubles. One of the design goals of OpenSSH was to
operate it in the wild. I do not know whether this was also one of the
design goals of Erlang distribution. I tend to deny this since I read
distribution_handshake.txt ("This is not entirelly safe, as it is vulnerable
against takeover attacks, but it is a tradeoff between fair safety and
Erlang SSL distribution is currently broken. You cannot control which IP
address epmd binds to...

I think in the area of IT security you have to choose the defensive
approach. You need a proof or very good hints that something is secure
before you can assume it to be secure. Therefore I handle Erlang
distribution as if it were unsafe.

By the way I am only referring to open source Erlang. I cannot say anything
about the commercial version of Erlang.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://erlang.org/pipermail/erlang-questions/attachments/20071203/8f011207/attachment.htm>

More information about the erlang-questions mailing list